On 6 October, during a visit by India’s External Affairs Minister, Ghana’s Foreign Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa announced that Cabinet had approved a formal application to join BRICS. Dr Jaishankar pledged India’s support but noted that the wider grouping must consider the application.

Days later, the Minister clarified that Ghana is applying as a partner country, not a full member. The debate that followed quickly became partisan and ideological: East versus West, Beijing and Moscow versus Washington and Brussels.

But that framing misses the point. Ghana has belonged to “clubs” for nearly seventy years: the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the IMF, the World Bank and many more. The real question is not which clubs we join. It is whether we have the strategic clarity and state capacity to extract value from any of them.

What Ghana is actually applying for

BRICS offers several levels of association. Full members, now eleven including Africa’s trio of South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia, take decisions by consensus. Partner countries, a tier created in 2024, attend summits and some meetings but do not shape decisions; ten joined in 2025, among them Nigeria and Uganda.

The New Development Bank is legally separate and open to non-members. Ghana, if successful, will join the partner tier. It also matters what BRICS is not. It has no founding treaty, no permanent secretariat, no free-trade area and no automatic funding window. The Minister described it as arguably the largest trading bloc today. Its members are indeed vast economies, but BRICS has no common tariff or trade rules; trade with its members still happens bilaterally. Partner status is a seat in the room, not access to a market or a fund.

The Nkrumah lesson, read properly

The Minister has rightly invoked Ghana’s tradition of non-alignment, recalling how Kwame Nkrumah secured American support for the Akosombo Dam while the Soviet Union helped launch Ghana’s nuclear programme. The precedent is instructive, but its lesson is often misread. Nkrumah did not get Akosombo by joining a club. He got it through prepared projects, a clear national vision and skilful bilateral bargaining with each superpower. Non-alignment gave him room to manoeuvre; preparation is what turned that room into a dam. The Non-Aligned Movement itself built nothing in Ghana.

What our memberships have taught us

Ghana’s record shows the wide gap between belonging and benefiting. We host the African Continental Free Trade Area secretariat in Accra, yet Ghanaian firms’ use of the agreement remains modest. Hosting brought prestige, not automatic trade. We have been members of the IMF since 1957 and have returned to it repeatedly to borrow; it has served as a lender of last resort, not a ladder to transformation. ECOWAS and the AU deliver real public goods, from free movement to mediation, but Ghana rarely arrives at their negotiations with a fully prepared national economic position.

The exception proves the rule. During the 2023–2024 crises, Afreximbank provided about $700 million. It worked because there was a specific need, a ready institution and a clear ask. Value flows to states that arrive knowing exactly what they want.

The case for joining

The decision has genuine merit, and it deserves a fair hearing. First, partner status is a low-cost hedge in a fragmenting world. Western institutions are retrenching: aid budgets are shrinking, US health funding to Ghana is being phased out, and Washington has withdrawn from dozens of international bodies. A state that depends on a single set of partners has no fallback when those partners change course. Diversification is prudence, not defiance.

Second, the signal may improve Ghana’s leverage. Partners who fear losing influence sometimes offer better terms. Countries that are courted by several suitors negotiate from strength.Third, relationships with BRICS members are already deepening. The Minister reports that trade with India has grown from around $3 billion in 2024 to about $7 billion, with cooperation planned in pharmaceuticals, railways, defence and digital technology. China remains a major economic partner. A seat at BRICS meetings offers regular access to these governments at the highest level.

Fourth, the BRICS agenda overlaps with Ghana’s: reform of global financial institutions, fairer terms for commodity producers, settlement in local currencies, and a stronger voice for the Global South.And the government has been cautious. It has said Ghana is not walking away from the IMF, the World Bank or Europe, and it briefed EU member states before the announcement. That is how a hedge should be managed.

The risks

The costs are real, but manageable if anticipated.Sanctions exposure: Russia and Iran face extensive Western sanctions. Closer economic ties with them can complicate correspondent banking, insurance and procurement, areas where Ghana still depends heavily on Western systems.

Retaliation: In July 2025, as BRICS leaders met in Rio, President Trump threatened an additional 10 per cent tariff on any country aligning with what he called the bloc’s anti-American policies. A partner country is unlikely to be a priority target, but the risk must be weighed rather than dismissed.Unequal partners: BRICS is not a club of equals. China’s economy outweighs the rest of the group combined, and finance from any source arrives with terms. Resource-backed loans can trade short-term cash for long-term control of strategic assets.

Internal divisions. India and China are strategic rivals, and members disagree on how anti-Western the bloc should be. A grouping that struggles to agree among its members may have little to offer those at its edge.

None of this argues against joining. It argues for joining with eyes open, and with a plan to manage each risk.

What our peers show

The early evidence from Africa is instructive. Egypt and Ethiopia became full members in 2024. Ethiopia’s relief came through an IMF programme approved in July 2024 and a debt deal with official creditors under the G20 Common Framework, negotiated by China and France on behalf of the creditor committee. Egypt was rescued in 2024 by an expanded IMF loan of $8 billion and a $35 billion investment deal with the UAE. The UAE is itself a BRICS member, but the deal was bilateral, not a product of the bloc. In both cases, the decisive help came through traditional institutions and direct bargaining. BRICS membership did not transform either economy.

Nigeria and Uganda became partner countries in 2025. It is too early to judge, but there is little public evidence yet of concrete financing or trade gains flowing from that status. Ghana should study both closely, and learn from what they did, or failed to do, to make the partnership pay.

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The capabilities we must build

Whether BRICS delivers for Ghana will depend less on the bloc than on us. Eight capabilities matter;

1. A written foreign economic strategy naming the handful of national goals every partnership must serve: industrialisation, energy, mineral value addition, technology and cheaper finance.

2. Economic intelligence and analysis: a dedicated capacity tracking what each partner wants, what it offers and where the risks lie.

3. Negotiation and trade-law expertise: lawyers, economists and sector specialists who can read a term sheet, not merely attend a summit.

4. A clear owner for each membership. Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade and the Bank of Ghana must coordinate, with one lead accountable for results.

5. A bankable project pipeline. Development banks fund prepared projects, not good intentions.

6. Private-sector readiness: standards, certification, export finance and logistics, so Ghanaian firms can use new openings.

7. Risk management covering sanctions exposure and the reaction of traditional partners.

8. A membership scorecard: a periodic public review of every organisation Ghana belongs to, what it costs and what it delivers.

Questions before any club

Every future decision to join, upgrade or remain should answer a short set of questions.• What specific outcome do we want that we cannot get bilaterally?• What will it cost in dues, alignment pressure and risk to other relationships?• Is a lower tier enough, or does fuller membership add something concrete?• Who owns it, and how will we measure success in three years?• Do we have the people to participate actively, or will we merely attend?• How does it fit our ECOWAS and AU positions?• What would exit require if it fails to deliver?

How we will know

This argument is testable. It would be proved wrong if BRICS begins delivering automatic benefits to partners, such as trade preferences or reserved development finance; if the signal alone wins Ghana better terms from traditional partners; or if Nigeria and Uganda show measurable gains without deliberate preparation. Those are the indicators to watch, alongside whether the Ministry publishes objectives and success measures for this membership. On the evidence of Ghana’s other memberships, I expect benefits to track preparation.

Capable, not aligned

Nkrumah’s genius was not choosing sides. It was knowing exactly what Ghana needed and being ready to take it from whoever could provide it. That remains the test. The debate Ghana needs is not East or West, but capable or not. Membership is a door. Strategy, preparation and institutions decide whether we walk through it with something to show.

The author, Nana Attobrah Quaicoe, is an Intelligence and National Security Analyst, a former Director General of the Bureau of National Intelligence (2022–2025), and writes on national security and intelligence sector reform, risk, integrity assessment, and institutional governance in the Ghanaian context.